STATE OF MINNESOTA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE

In the Matter of the Contested Case of Residential Alternatives, Inc., d/b,/a Residential Alternatives V, and Wright County human Services Agency

Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING

MOTION V.

TO DISMISS

Minnesota Department of Public Welfare,

Respondent.

On June 21, 1983, Charles C. Jensch, Petersen, Tews & Squires, P.A., 600

Northwestern National Bank Building, St. Paul, Minnesota 55101, Attorneys for

Pesidential Alternatives, Inc., (the "Facility") served a Motion to Dismiss

upon, Mr. Frank Norton, Assistant Wright County Attorney, Courthouse, 10 North-

west Second Street, Buffalo, Minnesota 55313, Attorney for Wright County Hunan

Services agency (the "couunty"), and upon John M. Kir-win, Special Assistant

Attorney General, 515 Transportation Building, John Ireland Boulevard, St.

Paul, Minnesota 55155, Attorney for the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare

(the "Department"). The facility's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss and $\,$

its Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss were filed with the office $\ensuremath{\mathsf{S}}$

of Administrative Hearings on June 29, 1963. Neither the County, nor the Department responded to the Motion filed.

Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, it is $\operatorname{Ordered}$

that the facility's Motion to Dismiss be and the same is hereby denied.

Bated this 6th day of July, 1983.

JON L. LUNDE Hearing Examiner

MEMORANDUM

On September 17, 1982, the Department notified the Facility and the County

of the Facility's per diem rate for the period from April 6, 1981 to April 30,

1982 and for the fiscal year commencing May 1, 1982. Both the Facility and

tie County appealed the Department's $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right$

period set forth in 12 MCAR 2.052B.5.c.

The Facility has moved for an order dismissing the Counnty's appeal on the

grounds that it fails to particularize the nature of its disagreement with the $\,$

rate determination made by tie Department. The Facility argues &vat tie

County's failure to particularize the grounds for its appeal from the rate $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right) +\left(1\right) \left(1\right) \left(1\right) +\left(1\right) \left(1$

determination violates the provisions of 12 MCAR 2.052B.5.d. and requires

dismissal. The Hearing Examiner is not persuaded that dismissal is required

or appropriate.

The per diem rates that may be charged by institutions providing resi-

dential services for the mentally retarded are governed by the provisions of

12 MCAR 2.052 (Rule 52). Rule 52B.5., pertaining to appeal procedures ap-

plicable to disputes arising under the rule provides in part as follows:

5. Appeal procedures.

- a. Scope of appeals procedures. These procedures describe the manner by which unresolved individual provider or county welfare board disputes that may arise about application of these regulations excluding regulation B.5. will lye settled. Unresolved disputes are defined as those disagreements that cannot be resolved informally between the proprietor -and Cie department staff normally assigned responsibility for administration, or the provider and a county welfare board.
- b. Appeals examiner. Unresolved disputes will be heard by a staff person from the state of Minnesota's Hearings Examiner office.
- C. time limit. The provider, or the county, has 30 days to appeal from the date of the department's notification of the new per diem rate.
- Appeal procedure. If the provider and the department staff normally assigned responsibility for administration or the provider and the county welfare board cannot agree to a settlement of the dispute, then each party will submit in writing, the facts, arguments and any other appropriate data to the hearings examiner. The examiner will review the dispute, request additional information or analyses to be submitted by the department or the provider, and then recommend to the commissioner disposition of the dispute. Because existing state law does not permit the commissioner to delegate his powers, final authority on disposition of disputes must be retained by the commissioner.

, be Facility argues that since the $\mbox{\sc County}$ has not submitted to the $\mbox{\sc Hearing}$

Examiner the written facts, arguments and other data required any Part B.5.d.

that its appeal must be dismissed. It argues that appeals must be perfected

in a manner which gives proper notice to all parties concerned, and where an $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right)$

appeal fails to particularize grounds on which it is based, ',-he courts have

uniformally held the appeal to be fatally defective $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right)$

support of that proposition it cites in re State ex rel. Employment Security

Commission et al., 239 N.C. 651, 68 S.E.2d 311 (1951) Zier v. Bureau of Un-

employment Compensation, 151 Chic St. 123, 84 N.E.2d 746 (1949) and Davidson

v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 87 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. 19(63). None of

those cases support dismissal of the County's appeal in this case. on the

contrary, in each of the cited cases, appeals to a court from final agency

decisions were involved and the statutes under which the appeals were made

specifically required that the appellant specify the errors appealed from.

In this case, rule 52B.5.c., governing appeals from rate determinations,

does not require that the grounds for tie County's appeal be specified. Under

Part B.5.d., there is language which provides that in the event the parties

cannot agree to a settlement each party will submit, in writing, the facts

arguments and other appropriate data to the Hearing Examiner. However, that

language does not require dismissal here. That language, assuming it to be

applicable at all, specifies the manner in Which the Hearing Examiner would

assemble a record and does not specify the manner in Which a proper appeal

made . To the extent that it purports to govern hearing procedures, it is

largely superceded by rules of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

The usual rule is that the functions of administrative agencies and courts

are different, and rules governing judicial proceedings are not ordinarily

applicable to administrative agencies unless made so by statute.

See, e.g.,

Gray Well Drilling Co. v. Wisconsin State Board of Health, 263 Wis. 417, 419,

 $58 \ \text{N.W.}$. $2d \ 64$, $65 \ (1953)$. As Professor Davis has noted, the "most important

characteristic of pleadings in the administrative process is their unimpor-

tance." I Davis Administrative Law Treatise 13.04 (1958). As Davis points

out in that section, as long as a party has notice of the issues prior to the

actual hearing, and an opportunity to prepare to meet them, deficiencies in

pleadings are cured, regardless of any formalized pleading requirements that

might be applicable to the courts.

Although the Facility may not clearly understand the nature of the

County's objections to the rate determination issued by the Department, the

Hearing Examiner has already ordered the County to file a prehearing

specifiying the cost items objected to and the factual and legal basis for its

objections. This will give the facility notice of the grounds for the $\ensuremath{\,}$

County's objections and the facts or law it relies upon.

In sum, the Facility's motion to Dismiss must be denied because there is

no statute or rule which requires the County to particularize the grounds for

its appeal at the time its appeal is filed.